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Introduction 
Systematicity: The Nature of Science? 
 
This special issue provides a forum for the discussion of Paul Hoyningen-Huene’s book 
Systematicity: The Nature of Science (2013) and the approach it introduces. Hoyningen-
Huene’s book marks the first attempt in many years to provide a comprehensive 
philosophical account of science at the highest possible level of generality and abstraction. 
It raises one central question: what is the nature of science? Before turning to Hoyningen-
Huene’s own answer and the contributions in this collection, let us put the question into 
context.  
 
Many scholars working in the philosophy of science are inclined to declare the question 
about the nature of science as futile. The question makes a problematic presumption, they 
argue, namely that there must be something that all practices subsumed under the term 
“science” have in common. But a close look at modern science just reveals an 
overwhelming diversity of experimental and computational methods, theoretical 
approaches, and epistemic standards that are applied in a huge variety of disciplinary 
traditions — especially if we follow Hoyingen-Huene and take the broad meaning of 
“science”, as in the German term Wissenschaft. It would seem that fields like Eastern 
European history and antibiotic resistance research, for instance, have very little in 
common; any features that they happen to share, like the fact that they are both 
established and conducted in academic institutions, appear to be of little philosophical 
interest, let alone revealing anything essential or significant about science in general. 
After all, investigating the “essence” or “nature” of anything has been shown to be an 
ineffective enterprise in a great number of cases. From this perspective, trying to answer 
the question “What is the nature of science?” appears to be a fruitless, or even misguided, 
philosophical project. 
 
As a matter of fact, philosophers of science have rarely tackled this question in recent 
decades.1 Instead, there has been an emphasis on the disunity of science (see for instance 
Dupré 1993; Galison and Stump 1996; Cartwright 1999). And almost like the sciences 
                                                        
1 Of course, there are a handful of notable exceptions to the widespread skepticism against a general 
philosophy of science. See for instance Psillos (2012).  
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themselves, philosophy of science has witnessed a strong tendency towards ever-greater 
specialization. The philosophies of the special sciences have diversified to the extent that 
it has become difficult to recognize many points of contact between them.  
 
Despite the good reasons that exist for philosophers of science to focus their research on 
specific scientific disciplines or to tackle highly specialized ontological, epistemological 
and methodological problems, we, the guest editors of this special issue, are driven by the 
belief that raising the question about the nature of science in the most general sense is 
still relevant and philosophically legitimate. There are four main reasons for thinking that 
there should be room for a general philosophy of science and its central question about 
the nature of science: 
 
(1) The question is relevant for philosophy in a broad sense, as one of the main goals of 
modern philosophy has been to act as an intermediary between what Wilfrid Sellars 
(1962) called the “manifest image” and the “scientific image” of the world. How should we 
reconcile recent findings in neuroscience with our common sense concept of free will and 
rational action? Is it possible to integrate the concepts of modern physics with our 
everyday understanding of notions like space, time, and causality? To what extent is our 
everyday understanding of personal success compatible with insights of empirical 
educational research stressing latent environmental determinants of success? How 
should we modify our folk psychology in light of recent findings in astrology and voodoo 
healing? If you were slightly confused after reading the third question, perhaps you are 
not entirely sure whether educational research really contributes to the “scientific image” 
of the world. If you flinched after reading the fourth question, you probably share the 
common conviction that astrology and voodoo metaphysics are not part to the scientific 
image of the world. But what is it that makes neuroscience and physics a legitimate 
contributor to the scientific image, but perhaps not educational research, and certainly 
not astrology and voodoo healing? In other words, what is it that distinguishes science 
from other forms of epistemic engagement with reality? In many areas of philosophy 
answers to these kinds of questions seem to be presupposed implicitly. We think, 
however, that it is important to investigate carefully the grounds for each answer and the 
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related concept of the “scientific image”. In our opinion, grounding various discourses in 
philosophy in a broad sense is a key task for a general philosophy of science.2 
 
(2) As mentioned above, philosophy of science has branched into a large number of sub-
fields in the philosophy of the special sciences in the last decades. There exist not only 
philosophies of the natural sciences (physics, chemistry, biology etc.) and of the social 
sciences (sociology, ethnography, economics etc.), but many more philosophies of the 
special sciences, including the humanities (historiography, literary studies, jurisprudence 
etc.) the formal sciences (mathematics, theoretical informatics, statistics etc.) and even 
some philosophies of interdisciplinary sciences (e.g. climate science and cognitive 
science). We certainly do not believe that all these sub-disciplines should be re-integrated 
in some kind of all-encompassing general philosophy of science. However, the 
philosophies of the special sciences do need some kind of common core linking together 
at least some of their aspects. Without such a background or some dialogue concerning 
the nature of science, it remains unclear why the “special sciences” should be considered 
different instances of a coherent category of “science” at all. If one is not ready to accept 
the disparity between the different sub-fields of philosophy of science as a brute fact that 
needs no explanation, addressing the question about the nature of science from a general 
perspective becomes unavoidable.  
 
(3) A similar argument holds for science itself. As is well known, modern science has 
specialized into a vast number of heterogeneous sub-disciplines. Many observers of 
science have been quite critical of this development, lamenting a lack of integration of 
scientific knowledge and “professional atomization“ (Wilson 1999: 42), which may seem 
even more problematic in light of the grand challenges of the 21st century such as climate 
change and food security issues, to name just two examples. We do not believe that 
philosophy of science can or should unite the sciences into some kind of grand system of 
knowledge. We do believe, however, that philosophy of science can and should help to 
illuminate connections between different scientific disciplines, thereby (a) articulating a 
sense of unity permeating the scientific enterprise as a whole, (b) justifying the common 
and unified institutional organization of various disciplines, (c) promoting 
                                                        
2 In a plenary address at the meeting of the European Philosophy of Science Association in September 
2017, Philip Kitcher also advocated the idea that philosophy of science can be of great value for 
philosophy more broadly, in particular for ethics and metaphysics. 
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interdisciplinary discourse and understanding, and, last but not least, (d) supporting 
science education, which needs to presuppose some idea of the scientific enterprise after 
all. 
 
(4) The final reason for the importance of the question about the nature of science is 
linked to its public role. Trust in science as a provider of rational guidance for policy-
making and an unbiased source of facts for society has been eroding in certain contexts in 
recent years – with Turkish schools dropping the theory of evolution from the curriculum 
and the prevalence of anti-science politics in the US as particular low points (see Kingsley 
2017 and Nuccitelli 2017 for illustrative purposes, and Mooney 2005 for a longer-term 
view). The credibility of science has been damaged due to external factors, such as doubt-
mongering by industry lobbyists or anti-science propaganda by politicians (see Oreskes 
and Conway 2010), as well as internal issues such as data manipulation or fraud by 
prominent scientists (see Judson 2004). Hence, the debate concerning the justification of 
the (alleged) special status of science as a provider of objective knowledge is gaining 
renewed urgency, clearly recognized by sociologists of science such as Sergio Sismondo 
(2017) — an urgency that philosophers of science should not ignore. 
 
Some History 
In order to understand how Hoyningen-Huene’s approach relates to previous attempts 
that have been made to clarify the special character of science and scientific knowledge, 
we want to give a brief overview of the relevant developments in the philosophy of science 
in the twentieth century. Hoyningen-Huene himself is very conscious about how his view 
compares and connects with existing views, and we want to provide some background 
here that will help situate Hoyningen-Huene’s contribution historically. The material in 
this section will mostly be common knowledge to well-informed philosophers of science, 
but we hope it will be helpful to various other readers. 
 
At the risk of oversimplification, we find it instructive to distinguish three major phases 
in the history of 20th-century philosophy of science (including the beginning of the 21st 
century). The first of these phases was dominated by the quest for a unified image of 
science. In the second phase, this view was modified to show science as a contingent and 
heterogeneous enterprise, while in the third (ongoing) phase science is characterized by 
a complex image of disciplinary diversity. We will attempt to highlight aspects of the 
 5 
developments that are particularly relevant to the positioning of Hoyningen-Huene’s 
work. 
 
(I) Logical Empiricism and Critical Rationalism: The Unity of Science 
Logical empiricism dominated the first phase, which roughly lasted from the early 
decades of the twentieth century into the 1950s.3 The main programmatic goal of the 
logical empiricists was to combine the empiricist philosophical traditions of the 18th and 
19th century with the recently developed tools of formal logic in order to provide a new 
and stronger epistemological foundation for modern science. All sciences should become 
unified through one single method, and that method consisted in the application of the 
tools of logical analysis to the material given in immediate experience (Neurath et al. 1973, 
pp. 306-307). 
 
The image of science that emerged out of this type of inquiry was dominated by three 
main programmatic features: 1) An unconditional commitment to empirical testability: 
any meaningful and legitimate scientific claim has to be verifiable by empirical data. 
Theories that make untestable claims about empirical reality must be rejected as 
metaphysical and unscientific. 2) A rejection of the synthetic a priori: all knowledge about 
empirical reality has to be derived inductively from empirical data. Experience was not 
only considered as the only legitimate authority for the verification of a theory, but also 
as the only legitimate source of scientific knowledge. 3) An ideal of a unified science: 
empirical testability and logical analysis provide the methodological foundation not only 
for the natural sciences, but likewise also for the social sciences.  
 
A major obstacle for the logical empiricists was the problem of finding a workable 
verificationist criterion of meaning. For one thing, the full logical reduction of theoretical 
statements to purely observational statements turned out to be more difficult than 
expected (Carnap 1936). For another, despite the empiricist’s artful attempts to solve the 
problem of induction, the complete verification of general statements by means of 
inductive logic turned out to be a difficult task (Reichenbach 1940, Creed 1940). The 
logical empiricists finally had to accept the fact that science contained non-reducible, 
                                                        
3 Following Richardson and Uebel (2007), we are using the term “logical empiricism” as synonymous to 
“logical positivism” or “neo-positivism”.  
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experience-transcending statements that could neither be reduced to observational 
statements nor be fully verified by use of inductive methods, and thus could not be 
considered cognitively significant in the strict sense by their own reckoning. In light of 
these serious problems, Carl Hempel suggested a shift away from a strictly positivist 
program towards an analysis of the methodology of empirical science and a focus on 
topics like explanation, reduction, theory and simplicity (Hempel 1950; 1951).  
 
Another attempt at liberating empiricism from the troubling consequences it had run into 
by its commitment to an inductive methodology was famously suggested by Karl Popper 
in his Logic of Scientific Discovery (1935, first Englisch edition 1959). Popper remained 
fully committed to the basic principles of empiricism and to the empirical testability of 
scientific claims. However, due to the logical asymmetry between verification and 
falsification, scientists should try to falsify theories instead of verifying them. Despite all 
the differences to the logical empiricist program, Popper’s approach, often dubbed 
“critical rationalism”, likewise drew a picture of science that had the problem of method at 
its focal point. To do philosophy of science still meant thinking about scientific 
methodology. 
 
One of the greatest shortcomings of both philosophies was that they were prescriptive 
while being quite detached from actual scientific practice. They conveyed a theory of how 
science ought to proceed that was often at odds with how successful scientists actually 
went about their endeavors and how major scientific progress was achieved. Whenever 
such normative philosophies of science were exposed to the actual history of science, their 
unrealistic nature became apparent. But it took quite some time before the philosophical 
community came to accept the importance of history for the philosophy of science. 
 
(II) The Dawn of Modern HPS: Scientific Heterogeneity 
Thomas Kuhn’s landmark Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) is considered as one 
of the most important works in modern philosophy of science. Referring to the works of 
Ludwik Fleck and Norwood Russell Hanson, and drawing on his own extensive expertise 
as a historian of science, Kuhn came to the conclusion that the philosophy of science 
needed to overcome the influence of a simplistic account of the history of science. The 
actual dynamics of scientific knowledge was much more intricate and discontinuous than 
either logical empiricism or critical rationalism had suggested.  
 7 
 
Although Structure was originally commissioned as part of the logical empiricist 
Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Kuhn’s claims did not resonate well within the 
philosophical community at the time. In fact, Kuhn was not taken very seriously among 
philosophers. The 1967 edition of Edward’s Encyclopedia of Philosophy does not even 
mention Kuhn’s book. Paul Feyerabend helped to direct the attention of philosophers to 
Kuhn’s ideas. Feyerabend had already acquired a decent reputation as a philosopher in 
the early 1960s. His 1962 article “Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism” also provided 
a strong criticism of logical empiricism and critical rationalism, and like Kuhn, 
Feyerabend also used the controversial concept of incommensurability to characterize 
the conceptual ruptures that we find in the development of science.  
 
Logical empiricists and critical rationalists both tended to oppose Kuhn’s and 
Feyerabend’s ideas. However, some took up the challenge and engaged in the debate. Imre 
Lakatos’ “Criticism and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes” (1968) may 
be seen as a dialectical attempt to integrate the novel ideas of Kuhn, Feyerabend and 
others into a sophisticated version of critical rationalism. Despite Lakatos’s own strong 
normative bent, philosophers’ attempts to accommodate Kuhnian insights tended to lead 
to less normative discussions in the field with a focus on the heterogeneity of different 
episodes of science, the dynamics of scientific change, and the importance of history of 
science for the philosophy of science. It was a rebirth of integrated history and philosophy 
of science, or HPS in short, which had in fact been pioneered in the late 19th century by 
the likes of Ernst Mach and Pierre Duhem, and William Whewell and Auguste Comte 
earlier. The fundamental insight of an integrated history and philosophy of science 
consists in the claim that science is a deeply historical process and that its objectivity and 
the legitimacy of its claims can neither be derived from the empirically given nor from 
some ahistorical rational or transcendental principles. As such, the historical turn in the 
philosophy of science poses a challenge to empiricist and critical rationalist accounts of 
science alike. 
 
Many of the debates initiated by Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos, and their contemporaries 
including Norwood Russell Hanson, Mary Hesse and Stephen Toulmin, are still continuing 
today. In particular the issue of scientific realism and the controversy about the rationality 
of theory change in science had a long-lasting impact. Feyerabend’s infamous slogan 
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“anything goes” — which was clearly intended as an ironical remark towards those who 
thought that science can be characterized by a single unified method — was often taken 
as a call to relativize epistemology and the epistemic status of scientific knowledge. 
Extreme relativists even suggested that there exist no general principles of rationality in 
science, and that science has no legitimate right to a higher status than other forms of 
human knowledge, because it was, like all forms of knowledge, the result of historical 
contingency and social construction. Others were more cautions with their conclusions. 
In any case, the historical turn in the philosophy of science made clear the need for a more 
sophisticated theory of science as a historically heterogeneous enterprise and the 
dynamics and rationality of scientific belief-change than the one provided by logical 
empiricism or critical rationalism. 
 
(III) The New Complexity  
The third phase of the development of the philosophy of science in the 20th century is not 
defined by a single dominant idea or overarching project. Philosophy of science from the 
late 1970s on is, in contrast, best described as fragmented in two dimensions. First, as 
already mentioned, we observe a specialization into a large number of sub-philosophies 
of the special sciences. Naturally, debates in these sub-fields are not focused on science as 
a whole but on their respective scientific fields. That does not mean that overarching 
considerations are completely absent. Critical debates concerning mechanisms, for 
instance, have relevance to neuroscience, the social sciences and the biomedical sciences, 
and philosophical investigations into the logic of narrative explanations are drawing from 
historiography, geology and paleontology. However, debates such as these are usually 
limited to a subset of the sciences. They do not address science in a general sense. 
 
The second dimension of fragmentation manifests itself in a great number of 
heterogeneous approaches to philosophy of science. There is no single mainstream 
project in current philosophy of science. In fact, there are many equally important 
approaches to the philosophical investigation of science. To be sure, HPS is still a thriving 
field. Even for philosophers who are not committed to the project of integrated HPS, 
historical case studies are commonly used to shed new light on old debates, or to gather 
evidence in support of established positions such as the pessimistic meta-induction 
against scientific realism (Donovan et al. 1988; Lyons 2016).  
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The social epistemology of science, also a descendant of Kuhn’s work (Barnes 1982), is 
another example. Beginning with the work of sociologists of scientific knowledge (e.g., 
Bloor 1976; Latour and Woolgar 1979) and feminist philosophers of science (e.g., Code 
1981; Harding 1982; Harding and Hintikka 1983; Keller 1985), there has been a growing 
interest in the social dimension of science: To what extent are epistemic aspects of science 
constituted by social factors? How do collectives generate and accept scientific facts? 
Some authors in this tradition have been pursuing a critical project, bringing to light social 
biases and cultural factors which are interfering with scientific objectivity (and similarly 
to those authors following Karl Marx and Karl Mannheim). Others have been eager to 
point out the more positive aspects of collective knowledge production in the sciences, 
e.g. the benefits of the division of cognitive labor (Kitcher 1990) and institutionalized 
norms of critical scrutiny in epistemic communities (Longino 1990). Heather Douglas 
(2000, 2007, 2009) has made an important contribution to the revival of the important 
debate about the value-free ideal of science and the role of social, ethical and political 
values in science (see also Machamer and Wolters 2004, Kincaid et al. 2007, Wilholt 2009, 
Brown 2013 and Betz 2013. For earlier contributions to the debate see Rudner 1953, 
Frank 1954, Hempel 1965 and Kuhn 1977). 
 
The “philosophy of science in practice” is yet another prominent recent approach to the 
study of science. While philosophers of science before the 1980s were predominantly 
concerned with theories as final products of science, Ian Hacking, Nancy Cartwright and 
others began to promote a new focus on scientific practice (see Soler et al. 2014). This led 
to a visible rise in philosophical studies of experimental practices (Guala 2005), the 
material dimension of science (Ankeny & Leonelli 2016), classificatory activities in 
scientific practice (Kendig 2016) and data-handling processes in the life sciences (Leonelli 
2016). Philosophers of scientific practice typically identify as naturalist philosophers 
whose methods are continuous with those of the sciences. As a consequence, methods 
from the arsenal of the social sciences have become more and more integrated into the 
philosophy of science, blurring the boundaries between philosophy of science and 
sociology of science (Wagenknecht et al. 2015). 
 
This snapshot of recent philosophy of science is not nearly complete. There are many 
more approaches: a number of scholars have sought to enrich philosophy of science, and 
science studies more generally, through a more serious attention to technology (e.g., 
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Scharff & Dusek 2003, Pt. IV; Hannsson 2015); various philosophers attempt to integrate 
analytical metaphysics and philosophy of science (e.g. Hicks and Schaffer 2017); there is 
a subfield of philosophers who are rebooting the logical empiricist project, carrying 
forward Carnap’s ideal of a formal philosophy of science (see Leitgeb 2011); and one of 
the authors of this introduction has argued that HPS can be seen as a continuation of 
science by other means (Chang 1999; Chang 2004, ch. 6).  
 
This complex state of the art advances a detailed, multilayered and pluralist mosaic of the 
sciences and of philosophy itself. Historical and contemporary case studies inform us 
about the epistemic details of scientific practice in the special sciences and lost paths of 
scientific discovery. Ontological investigations relating to different scientific fields remind 
us of the complexity of a “dappled” world (Cartwright 1999). And Bayesian philosophers 
of science are developing norms of rationality for theory change in the natural and the 
social sciences (Howson and Urbach 1989, Bovens and Hartmann 2003). However, no 
comprehensive and commonly acceptable image of science emerges from these 
endeavors. Apparently, the question about the nature of science has been dissolved in this 
new complexity. 
 
Hoyningen-Huene’s Systematicity Theory 
Paul Hoyningen-Huene’s book is a refreshing renewal of the attempt at drawing a general 
picture of science, and engaging with questions about the nature of science in general. 
Hoyningen-Huene’s main thesis is rather straightforward: Scientific knowledge 
distinguishes itself from other forms of knowledge through a higher degree of 
systematicity. In order to account for the manifold ways in which systematicity presents 
itself in science, Hoyningen-Huene unfolds the concept of systematicity along nine 
dimensions. These are: descriptions, explanations, predictions, the defense of knowledge 
claims, critical discourse, epistemic connectedness, an ideal of completeness, knowledge 
generation, and the representation of knowledge. The first part of the book is dedicated 
to an in-depth discussion of these nine dimensions of systematicity. A scientific discipline 
need not necessarily be systematic in all of the nine dimensions. There are many fully 
legitimate fields of science, which do not systematically engage in prediction, but may be 
highly systematic with respect to others. The systematicity of a scientific discipline, as 
Hoyningen-Huene conceives it, is a relative feature that displays itself only in comparison 
to corresponding parts of everyday knowledge. In this sense, scientific taxonomies, for 
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instance, are more systematic than systems of categorization found in everyday life, and 
that is precisely what marks their scientific character.  
 
In the second part of the book, systematicity theory is compared to the accounts of 
Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, logical empiricism, Popper, Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Rescher. All 
these philosophers made important contributions to our understanding of the nature of 
science, but, according to Hoyningen-Huene, gave only partial answers to the question 
“What is science?” Systematicity theory is supposed to be compatible with all the 
mentioned positions, but provides a more general account of the nature of science than 
its predecessors. They can thus be seen as “restricted versions of the idea of systematicity 
in nine dimensions” (Hoyningen-Huene 2013, p. 150).  
 
In the third part, some consequences for scientific knowledge and our understanding of 
science in general are discussed; in particular, consequences concerning debates about 
the genesis and the dynamics of science, about the relationship between science and 
common sense, and about the demarcation problem. 
 
The view of science that emerges from Hoyningen-Huene’s account differs from earlier 
comparable projects in three significant ways. First, unlike attempts at the question about 
the nature of science in phase I and II of our brief history above, Hoyningen-Huene’s 
approach is not restricted to the natural and the social sciences. It is his declared goal to 
understand and explicate the nature of science as generally as possible. This means that 
his analysis extends to the humanities, to the formal sciences and even to the theoretical 
parts of the arts. Thus, when Hoyningen-Huene speaks about “science” he uses the term 
in the broadest sense possible. 
 
Second, Hoyningen-Huene does not try to answer the question “What is science?” by 
providing a set of ahistorical and discipline-independent criteria that would allow one to 
formulate the necessary and sufficient conditions under which any practice might 
legitimately be called “scientific”. So the answer we may expect from Hoyningen-Huene 
will certainly not be a set of criteria that helps us to classify any given human practice 
under the label “scientific” or not, thereby capturing the essence of science. Instead, 
Hoyningen-Huene refers to Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblance, according to 
which the members of a certain class (for example, “games”) do not necessarily have to 
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share some essential property. Rather, the members of the class can be grouped into 
subclasses each of which will share some properties with some of the other subclasses. In 
the same vein, Hoyningen-Huene intends to approach the class of all sciences and the 
resemblances that exist among the individual members of that class. So, what he definitely 
does not provide is a definition of “science” in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.  
 
The third feature that distinguishes Hoyningen-Huene’s project from others concerns the 
intended contrast-class when investigating the nature of science. Usually, when 
philosophers have considered the nature of science in a general way, they did so with the 
intent to demarcate science from what they called pseudo-science or metaphysics. The 
primary contrast that Hoyningen-Huene has in mind is the one between science as a 
specific form of knowledge and other forms of knowledge. In particular, he wants to 
capture scientific knowledge in contrast to everyday knowledge. Accordingly, Hoyningen-
Huene’s account will not provide a clear-cut criterion for the traditional demarcation 
problem as traditionally conceived, which tended to focus on how to distinguish real 
science from inferior and problematic practices. But the account certainly will have 
something to say about how that problem should be approached and what a potential 
solution should be offering. 
 
Hoyningen-Huene’s approach has two (closely related) key advantages that we would like 
to stress. First, the complexity and diversity of the scientific enterprise is taken seriously 
instead of reducing science to a small number of core disciplines that philosophers of 
science happen to like most (i.e. physics, biology, perhaps psychology, and a pinch of 
medicine and social science). Second, it works bottom-up by looking at a great number of 
different scientific subfields and only then conceptualizing the main elements of science 
as a whole. This is indeed an advantage of Hoyningen-Huene’s approach, as it avoids 
certain forms of philosophy-of-science-imperialism, where every scientific discipline is 
squeezed into a narrow framework that has been derived from looking at only a small 
fragment of the scientific enterprise.  
 
Naturally, an approach that is this inclusive and ambitious raises a number of critical 
questions as well; for example: (1) Systematicity theory aims at encompassing all the 
sciences including the natural sciences, the formal sciences, the social sciences and even 
the humanities. Does Hoyningen-Huene really succeed in integrating these very different 
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disciplines in an all-encompassing and, at the same time, enlightening and non-trivial 
picture of science? (2) Hoyningen-Huene attempts to integrate the philosophies of science 
of his major predecessors (Descartes, Popper, Kuhn etc.) into systematicity theory. But is 
this attempt successful or does the author omit important features of their philosophical 
doctrines? (3) Systematicity theory focuses on scientific knowledge. Does that mean that 
it downplays scientific practice and sociological aspects of science that have been at the 
center of many cutting-edge debates in the philosophy of science in recent years? (4) In 
the last part of the book, Hoyningen-Huene outlines a diachronic approach to the 
traditional demarcation problem in philosophy of science that builds on the differences 
in the development of science and pseudo-science respectively. Is this context-sensitive 
approach really capable of dealing with pseudo-scientific challenges in the 21st century? 
Some of these questions and many more critical points will be addressed by the 
contributing authors of this special issue.  
 
Overview of the Special Issue 
The first contribution in this special issue, by Chrys Mantzavinos, is written in form of a 
dialogue between Paul Hoyningen-Huene and a student. The dialogue outlines the key 
aspect of systematicity theory and discusses several objections against it. In the last part, 
the student - who might be loosely based on the author of the dialogue – outlines an 
alternative theory of science, which is built around a specific concept of scientific 
rationality and the institutionalization of the possibility of criticism. 
 
Sara Green examines the relationship between scientific knowledge and common-sense 
intuitions. She gives special attention to the cognitive aspects of learning and doing 
science, and asks whether common-sense intuitions facilitate or impede scientific 
reasoning. Her conclusion is that an adjusted version of systematicity theory in 
combination with insights from cognitive science could help clarify important 
organizational aspects of science. 
 
Brad Wray argues that common-sense knowledge and scientific knowledge have to be 
considered as discontinuous in an important sense. Wray discusses some remarks to the 
contrary in Systematicity in order to defuse these and to corroborate the claim that 
Hoyningen-Huene indeed endorses what he calls the “discontinuity thesis”. In the last 
 14 
part of the paper, Wray connects this conclusion with a discussion of the epistemic 
authority of scientists, which appears to be based on the systematicity of science. 
 
Timothy Lyons examines systematicity theory in light of the scientific realism debate. He 
develops a sophisticated version of axiological realism, i.e. a realist hypothesis stating 
that science aims at a specific subclass of true claims, and argues that this hypothesis is 
not only compatible with systematicity theory but can actually explain and justify it on a 
deeper level. 
 
Alexander Bird uses a case from the history of clinical medicine in the eighteenth 
century (James Lurin’s investigations of smallpox) as a confirming instance for 
Hoyningen-Huene’s thesis that systematicity is a distinctive feature of science. Bird’s 
case illustrates how the processes required for producing the kind of knowledge sought 
by science need to be systematic in the ways described by Hoyningen-Huene.  
 
Naomi Oreskes provides a critique of systematicity theory’s approach to the 
demarcation problem, on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of three cases of what 
she calls “facsimile sciences”: homeopathy, creationism, and climate-change denial. 
Oreskes examines the ways in which these fields successfully mimic scientific 
systematicity. Thus, although they are non-scientific according to the standards of most 
philosophers and scientists, they would have to count as scientific according to 
Hoyningen-Huene’s theory, which suggests that aspects other than just systematicity are 
needed to demarcate science from facsimile sciences. 
 
Paul Hoyningen-Huene has contributed a response article to the papers in this special 
issue, in which he replies to the critical points raised in the contributions. He also takes 
the opportunity to clarify certain aspects of systematicity theory thereby taking the 
discussion about the nature of science further. Let us conclude this introduction by 
expressing our hope that this special issue will act as a catalyst for the advancement of 
the debate on the nature of science more broadly. 
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